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RETHINKING EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN
WASHINGTON STATE
Eva Sharf*
Abstract: The people’s right to referendum in Washington State is substantively limited in
only one way: the people cannot block through referendum “such laws as may be necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state
government and its existing public institutions.”1 This emergency exception to the referendum
power must be explicitly invoked by the Washington State Legislature in what is called an
“emergency clause.” Washington courts are willing to review emergency clauses to determine
if a bill is, in fact, “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety.” However, the courts have failed to articulate a coherent rule for deciding whether a
bill meets that standard.2 As a result, the Legislature routinely exempts from referendum bills
that do not address traditional emergencies—a practice that has been widely criticized.
To strike the right balance between the people’s referendum right and the Legislature’s
need to effectuate certain laws immediately, the courts should reexamine the purpose of the
emergency exception. This Comment proposes a standard for evaluating whether a bill
addresses an emergency. To meet that standard, the bill must accomplish a public purpose that
would be substantially destroyed if the Legislature was unable to act immediately. This
standard would allow the Legislature to effectively address circumstances that fail to resemble
traditional emergencies but nevertheless require immediate action. This standard is also
consistent with a key policy reason behind Washington’s emergency exception: preventing a
small minority (4% of voters required for a referendum) from undermining the ability of the
majority’s elected representatives to fulfill their legislative duty.

*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I wish to thank Professor
Hugh Spitzer for his thoughtful input and insightful comments, Marten King and Malori McGill for
their helpful feedback at various stages of this Comment's development, and the editors at Washington
Law Review for their valuable suggestions.
1. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
2. Id.
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“It might be illegal to yell ‘Fire!’ under false pretenses in a crowded
movie house, but yelling ‘Emergency!’ on the ﬂoor of the state legislature
(under false pretenses, for sure) was standard operating procedure this
year.”3
INTRODUCTION
This quote, the opening line of a Stranger article from 2005,
exemplifies a common criticism of the referendum system in Washington:
the Legislature declares bills “emergency legislation” solely to avoid a
referendum.4 The right to referendum allows the general public to block
acts by the Legislature from taking effect unless they survive a public
vote.5 Any person may initiate this procedure by gathering signatures that
amount to 4% of the votes cast during the previous gubernatorial election.6
A successful referendum petition will delay a bill from taking effect until
it is voted on during the next general election.7 To avoid the possibility of
a referendum, the Legislature can include an “emergency clause” in a bill,
indicating that the bill addresses an emergency and must take effect
immediately.8
The Legislature is often criticized for invoking its emergency
legislative power when a bill does not resemble a traditional emergency,
such as a public health crisis or natural disaster.9 But those criticisms are
misguided. In seeking to confine emergency clauses to bills addressing
traditional health and safety emergencies, the Legislature’s critics have
3. Stefan Sharkansky, State of Emergency, THE STRANGER: SOUND BITE (May 19, 2005),
https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/sound-bite/Content?oid=21434 [https://perma.cc/S95A-JHU6].
4. Id.
5. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
6. Id. (“The number of valid signatures of registered voters required on a petition for referendum
of an act of the legislature or any part thereof, shall be equal to or exceeding four percent of the votes
cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the filing of the text of the
referendum measure with the secretary of state.”). Referendum petitions originally required 6% of
legal voter signatures but no more than thirty-thousand total; amendment 30 reduced this requirement
to 4% of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. Philip A. Trautman, Initiative and Referendum
in Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L. REV. 55, 57 (1973). The signature requirement for an initiative
is higher, at 8%. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a).
7. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(d).
8. OFFICE OF THE CODE REVISER, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019, pt. II,
§ 11(k), at 21 (2019) [hereinafter BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019], http://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/
Documents/2019BillDraftingGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94A-UMSJ].
9. See, e.g., Sharkansky, supra note 3.
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misconceived the purpose of the emergency exception.10 A close look at
the emergency exception shows that the Legislature should be able to
respond immediately to a limited number of other circumstances that do
not resemble traditional emergencies but do require prompt action.11
Article II, section 1(b) of the Washington Constitution substantively
limits the people’s right to referendum in only one way: the people cannot
block through referendum “such laws as may be necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of
the state government and its existing public institutions.”12 This type of
emergency exception—a public safety exception—is common among
states that have adopted the referendum power.13 Of the twenty-three
states that have statewide referendum powers in their constitutions,14
about half of the constitutions include some version of an emergency
exception.15 The reasoning is relatively simple: an unfettered right to
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part V.
12. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
13. See infra note 14.
14. These states include (listed by year that the referendum process was adopted): South Dakota
(1898), Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Nevada (1904), Montana (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan
(1908), Missouri (1908), Maine (1909), Arkansas (1909), Colorado (1910), Arizona (1910), New
Mexico (1911), California (1912), Idaho (1912), Nebraska (1912), Ohio (1912), Washington (1912),
North Dakota (1914), Maryland (1915), Massachusetts (1918), Alaska (1958), and Wyoming (1967).
Chip Lowe, Public Safety Legislation and the Referendum Power: A Reexamination, 37 HASTINGS
L.J. 591, 592 n.8 (1986).
15. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“The referendum shall not be applied to dedications of revenue,
to appropriations, to local or special legislation, or to laws necessary for the immediate preservation
of the public peace, health, or safety.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3) (“[E]xcept laws
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or for the support
and maintenance of the departments of the state government and state institutions”); CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 9(a) (“[E]xcept urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax
levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.”); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“[E]xcept
as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, and
appropriations for the support and maintenance of the departments of state and state institutions”);
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16 (“An emergency bill shall include only such measures as are
immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety; and shall not include
(1) an infringement of the right of home rule for municipalities, (2) a franchise or a license to a
corporation or an individual to extend longer than one year, or (3) provision for the sale or purchase
or renting for more than 5 years of real estate.”); MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(a) (“[E]xcept as to laws
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and laws making
appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state
institutions and for the support of public schools”); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[E]xcept general
appropriation laws; laws providing for the preservation of the public peace, health or safety; for the
payment of the public debt or interest thereon, or the creation or funding of the same, except as in this
constitution otherwise provided; for the maintenance of the public schools or state institutions, and
local or special laws.”); OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(d) (“Laws providing for tax levies, appropriations
for the current expenses of the state government and state institutions, and emergency laws necessary
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referendum would allow a small minority16 to block legislation that needs
to be enacted quickly, thereby undermining the state legislature’s ability
to do its job.17 The objective of an emergency exception is to strike a
balance between the people’s right to referendum and the legislature’s
need to carry out certain laws immediately.18
To signal that a bill is exempt from a referendum, the Legislature
attaches an emergency clause containing the article II, section 1(b)
language.19 That is where things get murky. Although the Washington
State Supreme Court is willing to review emergency clauses to ensure that
they satisfy article II section 1(b)’s requirements, it has failed to articulate
a coherent rule for determining whether those requirements are met.20
Particularly, the Court has offered inconsistent guidance for whether an
act is “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety.”21 In doing so, the Court has oscillated between a narrow
interpretation of the language22 and a standard that gives the Legislature
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, shall go into immediate effect.”);
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“[E]xcept as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health, or safety”); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(3)(a), § 28 (Under § 1(3)(a), “The people reserve
to themselves the referendum power, which is to approve or reject at an election any Act, or part
thereof, of the Legislative Assembly that does not become effective earlier than 90 days after the end
of the session at which the Act is passed.” Under § 28, no act shall take effect until 90 days after the
end of the session “except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared in the preamble,
or in the body of the law”); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“[E]xcept such laws as may be necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its
existing public institutions.”); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(g) (“The referendum shall not be applied to
dedications of revenue, to appropriations, to local or special legislation, or to laws necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.”)
16. To place a referendum measure on the ballot in Washington, one must gather signatures
amounting to 4% of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
17. See State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 267, 148 P. 28, 30 (1915).
18. See State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 380 P.2d 735, 738 (1963)
(“[T]here is a most delicate balance between the emergent powers of the legislature and the people’s
right of referendum.”).
19. BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019, supra note 8, at 21.
20. Bryan L. Page, State of Emergency: Washington’s Use of Emergency Clauses and the People’s
Right to Referendum, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 222 (2008).
21. The emergency exception has been interpreted as two separate exceptions. Farris v. Munro, 99
Wash. 2d 326, 336, 662 P.2d 821, 827 (1983). The second exception, “support of the state government
and its existing public institutions,” has been reviewed more frequently by the courts, and the rule is
better developed. See generally Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28. Although there is still some
uncertainty around the second exception (the support-of-the-state-government exception), this
Comment focuses primarily on the first exception, the public safety exception, which covers laws
“necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” Farris, 99 Wash. 2d
at 336, 662 P.2d at 827.
22. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 318, 147 P. 11, 16–17 (1915) (adopting
a narrow interpretation of the public safety exception).
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more wiggle room (for example, upholding an emergency clause in a bill
financing a baseball stadium).23 Therefore, aside from waiting for courts
to make determinations on an ad hoc basis, there is no clear method to
predict whether an emergency clause is valid. The absence of a clear rule
is openly acknowledged in case law24 and in academic literature.25
The most perplexing case evaluating an emergency clause is CLEAN v.
State,26 in which the Washington State Supreme Court held that a bill
financing construction of a baseball stadium was validly exempt from a
referendum.27 Critics of the decision fail to see how funding a stadium
could possibly constitute an emergency.28 This reaction is understandable;
financing a baseball stadium hardly seems comparable to a traditional
emergency, and it is intuitively appealing to define “emergency” in the
traditional sense. However, this Comment argues that the desire to cabin
the emergency exception to traditional emergencies is misguided because
it fails to address other scenarios that legitimately require immediate
action.
This Comment proposes a standard for evaluating whether a bill fits
within the public safety exception to the right to referendum. The public
safety exception should exempt a bill from a referendum where the bill
accomplishes a public purpose and where that purpose would be
substantially thwarted if the Legislature was unable to act immediately.
This standard encompasses two scenarios requiring prompt action:
(1) cases where the harm is so severe that an immediate response is
necessary to mitigate ongoing damage, and (2) instances where a law’s
purpose would be irreparably undermined if the effective date were
delayed pending referral. This standard provides clarity in determining
whether a bill addressing a non-traditional emergency warrants exemption
23. See, e.g., CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 805, 928 P.2d 1054, 1065 (1996) (adopting a
broad interpretation of the public safety exception compared to that in Brislawn).
24. State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777–78, 380 P.2d 735, 738–39 (1963)
(“[I]n almost every prior decision on this point, the court was divided, or there was a concurring
opinion based on reasons different from those expressed by the majority . . . . It would be inaccurate
to say that our former decisions have been consistent in discussing and announcing the rule to be
applied.”).
25. Trautman, supra note 6, at 72 (“The court has interpreted this provision in a series of not always
consistent cases.”); Page, supra note 20, at 222 (“[C]ourts have been marred in confusion when
deciding cases challenging the validity of emergency clauses.”).
26. 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).
27. Id. at 782, 928 P.2d at 1054.
28. See Emergency Clause Reform Scheduled for Public Hearing, WASH. POLICY CTR (Jan. 24,
2013), https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/detail/emergency-clause-reform-scheduledfor-public-hearing [https://perma.cc/EVQ6-K836] (last updated Jan. 28, 2013); CLEAN, 130 Wash.
2d at 825 (Sanders, J. dissenting).
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under the clause and will also preclude the Legislature from misusing
emergency clauses to avoid a referendum.
By holding the Legislature accountable to a concrete definition of
emergency, this proposed standard also addresses a major criticism of the
Legislature’s use of emergency clauses: that the Legislature improperly
exempts bills from referendum that do not address traditional
emergencies. Currently, the perception of improper use of emergency
clauses comes from the absence of a clear standard for evaluating whether
a bill falls under the public safety exception.29 Because the Legislature
and courts have failed to articulate why certain non-traditional
emergencies require exemption, they appear to be ignoring the scope of
the public safety exception. This perception is bolstered when the
Legislature attaches an emergency clause to legislation addressing issues
that do not resemble traditional emergencies, such as public health crises
or natural disasters.30 But by clearly defining “emergency,” this
Comment’s standard would place the Legislature on notice of what a valid
emergency clause looks like. At the same time, it would give the public a
standard by which to judge emergency clauses. As a result, the Legislature
would be less likely to misuse emergency clauses to avoid a referendum,
and the public would be less likely to misjudge the Legislature’s behavior.
This Comment also rejects the primarily procedural solutions that
critics of the emergency clause have proposed. These solutions (e.g.,
requiring a supermajority vote to pass bills with emergency clauses) 31
attempt to make it more challenging to attach an emergency clause to a
bill. However, they fail to address the underlying issue: Washington law
has yet to coherently define what should constitute an emergency.32 By
looking to the purpose of the emergency exception to define “emergency,”
this Comment shows that procedural solutions are either inconsistent with
that purpose or unhelpful absent a coherent definition of emergency.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the people’s right to
referendum in Washington. Part II explains the technical requirements for
29. Sharkansky, supra note 3 (“Hardly any of these bills address palpable emergencies like
hurricanes or terrorist attacks.”).
30. Emergency Clause Reform Scheduled for Public Hearing, supra note 28 (asserting that
emergency clauses should only validly apply for “true public emergencies, like a large-scale natural
disaster or wide-spread epidemic disease”).
31. Page, supra note 20, at 271–79.
32. See State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777–78, 380 P.2d 735, 738–39 (1963)
(“It would be inaccurate to say that our former decisions have been consistent in discussing and
announcing the rule to be applied.”); see also Page, supra note 20, at 222 (“[C]ourts have been marred
in confusion when deciding cases challenging the validity of emergency clauses.”); Trautman, supra
note 6, at 72 (“The court has interpreted this provision in a series of not always consistent cases.”).
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and the historical use of both referendum measures and emergency clauses
in Washington. Part III examines judicial review of emergency clauses.
Part IV describes how the public has criticized emergency declarations
and surveys proposed reforms to the referendum process. Finally, Part V
proposes a standard for evaluating emergency clauses. The proposed
standard is consistent with Washington case law but provides a simpler
and more workable definition of emergency.
I.

THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO REFERENDUM IN WASHINGTON

In 1912, Washington State adopted, through amendment VII to the
Washington Constitution, an initiative and referendum process.33 The
right to referendum gives the people power to refer acts of the Washington
Legislature to a public vote before they become law.34 Essentially, a
referendum measure requires that a statute adopted by the Legislature be
approved or rejected by the people before taking effect.35 This right to
block legislative acts is considered an important check on the
government.36 For example, the referendum power enhances legislative
accountability to the people by forcing the Legislature to consider how
the public will respond to its actions.37 Although the original Washington
State Constitution, adopted in 1889, did not include an initiative and
referendum clause, article I, section 1, stated that “[a]ll political power is
inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the
consent of the governed.”38 Washington expressly reserved to the people
the right to initiative and referendum following a nationwide trend toward
restricting representative government and strengthening direct

33. Trautman, supra note 6, at 55.
34. Id.; OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON STATE 3 (2017),
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/initiative%20and%20referenda%20handbook%
202017%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DT9-QZB5] (last visited Aug. 14, 2019, 8:41 AM) [hereinafter
INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON].
35. Jeffrey T. Even, Direct Democracy in Washington: A Discourse on the Peoples’ Powers of
Initiative and Referendum, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 247, 251 (1996).
36. Page, supra note 20, at 234.
37. Id. (“The referendum forces the legislature to think about how the people will react to
legislation if enacted. Legislatures are often reluctant to pass bills that might mobilize referendum
efforts to strike down the law.”).
38. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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democracy.39 By some accounts, the intent of amendment VII was to give
“maximum power to the people in relation to the legislature.”40
Although the people’s right to referendum is viewed as an important
check on the Legislature, it is not unlimited. Amendment VII contains an
“emergency exception,” which limits the public’s right to referendum.41
Article II, section 1(b) exempts from referendum power “such laws as
may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public
institutions.”42 Thus, a bill containing article II, section 1(b) language (for
instance, a bill containing an emergency clause)43 is exempt from a
referendum and cannot be delayed or ultimately blocked by a popular
vote.44
In addition to adding the right to initiative and referendum,
amendment VII also eliminated a requirement that emergency measures
be approved by two-thirds of each house.45 Originally, laws (other than
appropriations bills) took effect ninety days after adjournment of the
session in which they were enacted.46 However, in cases of emergency, a
law could take effect before the ninety-day period if the Legislature
included a declaration of emergency in the act and if two-thirds of each
house voted for the measure.47 After amendment VII was enacted,
emergency measures no longer required approval by two-thirds of each
house.48
While the right to referendum is an important form of direct democracy
in Washington, the right is not without limits. The emergency exception
in article II, section 1(b) fundamentally limits the availability of the
referendum.49 This Comment explores the appropriate balance between
39. Trautman, supra note 6, at 55; see also Even, supra note 35, at 253 (“In 1898, South Dakota
became the first state to adopt the initiative and referendum. Between 1898 and 1918, 23 states
adopted at least one form of direct democracy.”).
40. Trautman, supra note 6, at 68.
41. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
42. Id.
43. The draft bill guide includes the following standard emergency clause language based on Art.
II § 1(b): “[t]his act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety,
or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect (immediately
or a specific date).” BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 2019, supra note 8, at 21.
44. Trautman, supra note 6, at 72.
45. Page, supra note 20, at 224.
46. WASH. CONST. art II § 31, repealed by WASH. CONST. amend. VII.
47. Id.
48. Page, supra note 20, at 224.
49. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
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the people’s right and the Legislature’s need to avoid a referendum in
certain circumstances.
II.

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR, AND HISTORICAL USE
OF, REFERENDUM MEASURES AND EMERGENCY
CLAUSES IN WASHINGTON

A.

Referendum Measures

The procedures for filing a referendum measure are fairly
straightforward. Any registered voter may file a petition for referendum.50
A referendum may target all or part of a statute.51 To successfully refer an
act of the Legislature to the ballot, a petitioner must gather signatures from
legal voters that amount to at least 4% of the votes cast during the previous
gubernatorial election.52 The petitioner must then file their petition with
the Secretary of State after the governor signs the bill into law (which
could happen before or after the legislative session is adjourned)53 and no
later than ninety days after adjournment of the session in which the bill
was passed.54 Once the Office of the Secretary of State certifies the
referendum petition, the statute is suspended and the referendum measure
is submitted to a public vote in the next state general election.55
Referendum measures are accepted or rejected by a simple majority
vote.56 If the people vote to support the Legislature and the bill is therefore
enacted, it cannot be amended or repealed within a period of two years
following its enactment unless two-thirds of each house vote to overturn

50. There are two types of referenda: referendum measures (laws passed by the legislature but
referred to a public vote by referendum petition) and referendum bills (proposed laws referred to a
public vote by the Legislature). At issue here are referendum measures. See INITIATIVES &
REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON, supra note 34, at 8.
51. Id.
52. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b). (“The number of valid signatures of registered voters required on
a petition for referendum of an act of the legislature or any part thereof, shall be equal to or exceeding
four percent of the votes cast for the office of governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the
filing of the text of the referendum measure with the secretary of state.”). Referendum petitions
originally required 6% of legal voter signatures but no more than thirty-thousand total signatures;
amendment 30 reduced this requirement to 4% of votes cast for in the last gubernatorial election.
Trautman, supra note 6, at 57. The signature requirement for an initiative is higher: 8%. WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
53. Even, supra note 35, at 260–61.
54. Id. at 260.
55. INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON, supra note 34, at 13.
56. Id. at 9. An exception is that gambling and lottery measures require 60% approval. See id.
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the bill.57 If the referendum measure successfully blocks the Legislature,
the bill will not go into effect.58
Many referendum measures fail to make the ballot because of the
difficulty of gathering signatures. From 1912 to the present, eighty-two
referendum measures have been proposed, but only thirty-seven have
been placed on the ballot for public vote.59 Of the referendum measures
that did not make the ballot, thirty-one did not submit signatures, eight
were withdrawn by the sponsor, two were submitted with insufficient
signatures, two were blocked because of emergency clauses, one was filed
prematurely, and one was blocked by a writ of prohibition.60 Out of the
referendum measures that successfully qualified for a spot on the ballot,
the public overturned the Legislature thirty times and supported the
Legislature seven times.61
B.

Emergency Clauses

Beyond procedural hurdles such as the signature requirement, the only
substantive limit on the right to referendum is the emergency exception
outlined in article II, section 1(b). To take advantage of the emergency
exception, the Legislature attaches to a bill an emergency clause
containing article II, section 1(b) language. A valid emergency clause
exempts the bill from a referendum.
Fifteen percent of bills enacted by the Legislature from 1997 until 2012
included emergency clauses.62 The Legislature used those emergency
clauses in a wide variety of bills, including bills providing funding for the
Seattle Mariners’s (a Major League Baseball team) stadium63; adopting
California’s vehicle standards64; requiring the use of apprentices on public
57. WASH. CONST. art. II § 1 (“No act, law, or bill approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon shall be amended or repealed by the legislature within a period of two years following such
enactment. Provided, that any such act, law, or bill may be amended within two years after such
enactment at any regular or special session of the legislature by a vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each house with full compliance with section 12, Article III of the Washington Constitution
and no amendatory law adopted in accordance with this provision shall be subject to referendum.”).
58. INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON, supra note 34, at 8.
59. History of Referendum Measures, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE: ELECTIONS,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics_referendummeasures.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q2WN-5EPJ].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Emergency Clause Reform Scheduled for Public Hearing, supra note 28.
63. S.B. 6049, 54th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1995), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/199596/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6049-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRC4-LKMU].
64. H.B. 1397, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2005-
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work projects65; establishing family and medical leave insurance66; and
securitizing a portion of the state’s revenue from a tobacco litigation
settlement agreement.67
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EMERGENCY CLAUSES
A.

Standard of Review

Washington allows for judicial review of whether the Legislature
appropriately used an emergency clause.68 Although they have not always
done so, the courts apply a deferential standard of review under which
they will find that an emergency exists unless the Legislature’s declaration
of emergency is “obviously false and a palpable attempt at
dissimulation.”69 More specifically, Washington courts consistently cite
the following language:
[S]uch legislative declaration of emergency and necessity for the
enactment is conclusive and must be given effect, unless the
declaration on its face is obviously false; and, in determining the
truth or falsity of the legislative declaration, we will enter upon
no inquiry as to the facts, but must consider the question from
what appears upon the face of the act, aided by the court’s judicial
knowledge. We must give to the action of the legislature and its
declaration of an emergency every favorable presumption.70
Put differently, the Washington State Supreme Court does not undertake
its own factual inquiry but instead looks at the Legislature’s act on its face,
aided only by judicially noticeable facts.71 Thus, the Court defers to the
Legislature’s declaration of an emergency unless it is obviously dubious,
giving the Legislature “every favorable presumption.”72

06/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/1397-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6J9-AFFU].
65. S.B. 5097, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/200506/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5097-S.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G5E-8AH7].
66. S.B. 5659, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/200708/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5659-S2.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6QR-SZ3F].
67. S.B. 6828, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/200102/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/6828.SL.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4HK-Y326].
68. Even, supra note 35, at 283.
69. Id.
70. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 807, 928 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1996); State ex rel. Hoppe
v. Meyers, 58 Wash. 2d 320, 326, 363 P.2d 121, 125 (1961)).
71. Even, supra note 35, at 283–84.
72. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 807, 928 P.2d at 1066 (citing Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772,
778, 380 P.2d 735, 739 (1963)).
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The Court, however, has not always applied such a deferential standard
of review.73 In some early cases, the Court treated the question of whether
the emergency clause was properly used as a question of law.74 In State
ex rel. Case v. Howell,75 a 1915 decision, the Court declined to defer to
the Legislature’s declaration of emergency: “[t]he said legislative
declaration has no greater effect, and is no more binding upon the court,
than if the Legislature had declared that a certain measure is or is not
constitutional. In such contingency that question would still remain for
the courts to determine.”76 Thus, the Court reviewed the matter de novo.77
But in another 1915 case, the Court stated that “[i]f the act be doubtful,
the question of emergency will be treated as a legislative question and the
doubt resolved in favor of the declaration of emergency made by the
legislative body.”78 Despite these early inconsistencies, courts appear to
have adopted the deferential standard of review.79
B.

History and Meaning of the Emergency Exception

Although the Court has settled on a standard of review, it has not clearly
defined what constitutes an emergency. The Court has held that article II,
section 1(b) contains two distinct exceptions to the right to referendum:
the first being “such laws as may be necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” and the second being
laws for the “support of the state government and its existing public
institutions.”80 The cases interpreting those exceptions are a story in
contrast. The Court has offered a relatively clear definition of the supportof-the-state-government exception by looking to the history and policy
reasoning behind Washington’s referendum provision, but it has failed to
do the same for the public safety exception. In Part V, this Comment
73. See State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281, 147 P. 1162 (1915).
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 287, 147 P. at 1164 (quoting State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 316, 147 P.
11, 16 (1915) (quotation omitted)).
77. See id.
78. Brislawn, 84 Wash. at 318, 147 P. at 16.
79. See CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 807, 928 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1996); see also Wash. State
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Reed, 154 Wash. 2d 665, 675, 115 P.3d 301, 305 (2005).
80. Farris v. Munro, 99 Wash. 2d 326, 335, 662 P.2d 821, 827 (1983). Essentially, the court has
read the language as excepting “such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health or safety, [or] support of the state government . . . .” Id. (citation omitted) (citing
State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash. 2d 320, 326, 363 P.2d 121, 125 (1961)). Thus, the second
exception—the support-of-the-state-government exception—does not require immediacy or
emergency.
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suggests that the court should clarify the public safety exception by
drawing on this policy reasoning.
1.

The Support-of-the-State-Government Exception

In State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen,81 a case decided soon after
Washington adopted the referendum power, the Washington State
Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the support-of-the-stategovernment exception. To ascertain the purpose and limitations of the
exception, Justice Chadwick looked to the legislative history behind the
adoption of Washington’s referendum power.82 He determined that the
drafters of Washington’s initiative and referendum clause had looked to
other states’ mistakes and successes for guidance.83 He therefore
considered the history of other state’s referendum provisions to discern
the drafters’ intent.84
In particular, Justice Chadwick focused on the history of Oregon’s
initiative and referendum provisions. Oregon adopted the initiative and
referendum process years before Washington.85 But unlike in
Washington, Oregon’s right to referendum was limited only in that it did
not apply to “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety”; it had no support-of-the-state-government
exception.86 Justice Chadwick explained that because of this “unbridled
license to refer legislation,” an Oregon state university’s operations were
threatened by a referendum.87 Prior to the referendum, Oregon’s
legislature passed an appropriations bill that funded the university
annually for two years.88 The bill was subsequently blocked by a
referendum petition, but the vote on the referendum measure was not
scheduled to happen until almost a year-and-a-half later during the next
general election.89 This created a significant issue: without funding from
the appropriations bill, the university would have had to shut down (it was
able to stay open only because professors agreed to work without pay).90

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915).
Id. at 264, 148 P. at 29–30.
Id. at 265, 148 P. at 30.
Id. at 270, 148 P. at 32.
Id. at 267, 148 P. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Even, supra note 35, at 281.
Id.
Id.
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Critically, the delay caused by the referendum process effectively quashed
the original appropriations bill even before the referendum measure was
placed on the ballot.91 Reasoning that the drafters intended to avoid such
a situation,92 the Court concluded that the drafters added the language
“support of the state government”93 to Washington’s emergency
exception to exempt from referendum acts “for the financial support of
the government and the public institutions of the state; that is,
appropriation bills.”94
Since Clausen, the Court has construed the support-of-the-stategovernment exception to encompass more than appropriations
measures.95 According to the Court, “support” includes any act that
generates revenue for the state.96
2.

The Public Safety Exception

Compared to the support-of-the-state-government exception, whether
the public safety exception validly exempts a bill from referendum is far
less clear.
In State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath,97 a case decided in 1915, the Court
construed the public safety exception narrowly. At issue was whether the
Legislature could rely on the public safety exception to immediately enact
a bill changing the composition of the Board of State Land
Commissioners.98 The bill’s emergency clause had been vetoed by the
Governor, but state legislators passed the bill over the Governor’s veto.99
Oddly, the plaintiffs were not seeking a referendum. 100 Rather, the
91. Id.
92. Clausen, 85 Wash. at 267, 148 P. at 30.
93. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
94. Clausen, 85 Wash. at 270, 148 P. at 31. The court summarized its position as follows:
We may well assume that the people of this state had no intention of falling into the error that
Oregon had made, and so framed their Constitution that our government and its institutions
should not be put to the embarrassments that might follow an agitation which could be supported
and a vote compelled by a number of the electors so small that it may be said to be merely
nominal—6 per cent. of the vote cast at a previous election. It would seem that they could not
have adopted plainer or simpler language than they did: ‘Support of the state government and its
existing institutions.’
Id. at 267, 148 P. at 31.
95. Farris v. Munro, 99 Wash. 2d 326, 336, 662 P.2d 821, 827 (1983).
96. Id. (“[S]upport is not limited to appropriation measures; if it generates revenue for the state it
is deemed support.”).
97. 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915).
98. Id. at 305, 147 P. at 12.
99. Id. at 304, 147 P. at 12.
100. Id. at 322, 147 P. at 18.
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challenge came from board members whose positions were threatened;
they argued that the act did not address an emergency and, therefore, could
not take immediate effect.101 The Court agreed, holding that the
emergency clause was invalid.102 The Court construed the public safety
exception narrowly, stating that “[e]mergency, in the sense of the present
Constitution, does not mean expediency, convenience, or best interest”
and that “[t]here is no room for construction or speculation.”103 Looking
to the bill, the court found that substituting certain state officers onto the
board was hardly an emergency. 104 Further, the Court held that the
functions of the State Land Commission would not be in any way
interrupted by a vacancy in membership if the bill was not enacted
immediately.105 Therefore, the bill was not necessary for the “immediate
preservation of the public peace, health or safety.”106 In fact, the Court
explained that “it may be said that it can make no real difference whether
this law goes into effect at the present time or 90 days after the close of
the session.”107 Thus, in this seminal case interpreting the public safety
exception, the issue was not a close one.108
CLEAN v. State was an entirely different story. In CLEAN, the Court
evaluated whether the emergency clause in the 1995 Stadium Act, which
imposed sales and use taxes to finance construction of a major league
baseball stadium in Seattle, fit within the public safety exception.109 By
passing the Stadium Act, the Legislature hoped to persuade the Mariners
(the local major league baseball team) to remain in Seattle.110 Thus, the
Court was asked to evaluate a bill that did not appear to fit within the
narrow definition of the public safety exception adopted in Brislawn.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the Stadium Act was properly exempt
101. Id. at 305, 147 P. at 12.
102. Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18.
103. Id. at 318, 147 P. at 16–17. The court also stated that “the Constitution does not take into
account convenience or necessity, except in so far as it touches the peace, health, and safety of the
state.” Id. at 321, 147 P. at 17.
104. Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18.
105. Id. at 320, 147 P. at 17.
106. Id. at 318, 147 P. at 16–17.
107. Id. at 322, 147 P. at 18.
108. There was a lack of consensus on the court; however, the point of disagreement was about
whether judicial review was appropriate. The dissent argued that it was not for the court to decide
whether the bill was emergency legislation because such a determination depends “entirely upon
conditions, and facts considered by the Legislature, of which, in the very nature of things, we have no
knowledge.” Id. at 323, 147 P. at 18 (Mount, J., dissenting).
109. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 803, 928 P.2d 1054, 1064 (1996).
110. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067.
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from a referendum.111 Writing for the majority, Justice Alexander
identified the emergency as a “clear and present danger” that the Seattle
Mariners “would depart this state if prompt action was not taken to assure
that a new publicly owned stadium would be developed in King
County.”112
In upholding the emergency clause, the majority rejected a narrow
construction of the public safety exception. While acknowledging that the
constitution does not define the terms “public peace, health or safety,”
Justice Alexander began by asserting that “those terms have, however,
been interpreted . . . as being synonymous with the exercise of the State’s
‘police power.’”113 The opinion then adopted a broad definition of police
power,114 noting that such power is limited only in that it “must reasonably
tend to promote some interest of the State” and may not violate the
constitution.115 However, an act is not exempt from a referendum simply
because the Legislature properly exercised its police power; rather, “it is
only a combination of the Legislature’s exercise of its police power and
an emergency that cancels that right.”116 Therefore, the Court reasoned
that an emergency clause is valid where (1) the act falls within the
Legislature’s police power and (2) an emergency requires immediate
action.117
Although the Stadium Act did not respond to a traditional emergency,
Justice Alexander nevertheless held that the bill addressed an emergency
requiring immediate action.118 Justice Alexander described the issue of
whether an emergency required immediate action as a “knotty question”
and hedged his analysis by asserting that the Court gives the Legislature
substantial deference when reviewing declarations of emergency. 119 The
Court then walked through the State’s argument that “an emergency
existed because in the absence of prompt legislative action a valuable
111. Id. at 782, 928 P.2d at 1054.
112. Id. at 808–09, 928 P.2d at 1067.
113. Id. at 804, 928 P.2d at 1065.
114. Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495, 506
(2000) (noting that CLEAN’s “broad definition of the police power appears overinclusive and thus
not analytically useful”).
115. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 805, 928 P.2d at 1065.
116. Id. at 805, 928 P.2d at 1065.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 812, 928 P.2d at 1068.
119. As discussed in Part III(A), the standard of review in CLEAN required that the legislature’s
declaration of emergency be conclusive “‘unless the declaration on its face is obviously false.’” Id. at
807, 928 P.2d at 1066 (quoting State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 778, 380 P.2d
772, 735 (1963)).
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community asset would be lost.”120 Acknowledging the plaintiffs’
contention that the lack of a baseball stadium could “hardly be equated
with an immediate threat to the populace,” the Court agreed that the
situation was not an emergency of “apocalyptic dimensions.”121 However,
the absence of a traditional emergency was not dispositive. Importantly,
the majority explained that “the Legislature was faced with a real
emergency in the sense that the public purpose they sought to achieve by
passing the Stadium Act would be unattainable” if the team was sold
before the Legislature could assure the owners that a new stadium would
be developed.122 Accordingly, the Court stated, “[i]n short, the Legislature
was justified in concluding that quick action was needed to preserve the
baseball franchise for the state of Washington and that any delay would
lead to the sale of the Mariners, thereby defeating the purpose of the
legislation.”123 The majority was therefore satisfied that the circumstances
constituted an emergency for the purposes of article II, section 1(b).124
Justice Guy, dissenting in part, did not agree that the Stadium Act
qualified as emergency legislation.125 Although he agreed with the
majority’s characterization of the exception itself, he took issue with the
boilerplate emergency clause language used in the Stadium Act. He
reasoned that the Legislature had failed to articulate the emergency in the
act itself.126 He explained, “I will defer to the judgement of the Legislature
whenever an ‘emergency’ situation, such as an immediately effective
consequence, is explained in the preamble of an act or in the emergency
clause itself, or is apparent from the nature of the act.”127 In other words,
Justice Guy would require the Legislature to explain the need for
immediate action somewhere in the act unless the emergency is
“apparent.”128
In a separate dissent, Justice Sanders argued for a narrower public
safety exception and against the majority’s deferential approach.129
120. Id.
121. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067.
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 810, 928 P.2d at 1068. Justice Talmage concurred, deferring to the legislature’s
declaration of emergency. He argued that “the most troublesome aspect of the dissent’s analysis . . . is
the notion a legislative declaration of fact, such as an emergency, is subject to intrusive judicial
review.” Id. at 815, 928 P.2d at 1070 (Tamalge J., concurring).
125. Id. at 820, 928 P.2d at 1072.
126. Id. at 821, 928 P.2d at 1073.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 825, 928 P.2d at 1075.
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According to Justice Sanders, a statute must meet three conditions to
qualify for the public safety exception: “(1) the necessity must be
immediate; (2) the statute must be necessary to solve the problem; and
(3) the problem must be of a particular kind, i.e. a disruption of the ‘public
peace,’ ‘health,’ or ‘safety.’”130 This test better adhered to precedent,
Justice Sanders argued, because “[c]ontrary to the majority’s claims, [the
Court had] consistently held that the emergency exception is much
narrower than the police power.”131 Moreover, Justice Sanders believed
that courts must evaluate an emergency declaration without deferring to
the Legislature on the issue of emergency (he acknowledged that the
courts defer to the Legislature’s factual findings).132 Applying these
principles, Justice Sanders would have declared the emergency clause
unconstitutional.133
In evaluating the public safety exception, the Court has oscillated
between a narrow interpretation of the language and a standard that gives
the Legislature more flexibility to declare that a bill addresses an
emergency. In CLEAN, the Court’s most recent in-depth look at the public
safety exception, Justice Alexander adopted a broad standard that does not
confine the exception to bills addressing traditional emergencies. Part V
of this Comment argues that the essence of that holding is correct.
Unfortunately, the Court’s opaque reasoning left the majority’s opinion
vulnerable to criticism.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE LEGISLATURE’S USE OF EMERGENCY
CLAUSES AND THE DEBATE OVER PROCEDURAL
CHANGES TO ENSURE THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO
REFERENDUM
The Legislature’s use of emergency clauses has been frequently
criticized as encroaching on the people’s right to referendum. 134 Some
130. Id.
131. Id. at 831, 928 P.2d at 1078.
132. Id. at 834–35, 928 P.2d at 1080 (“When faced with an emergency clause, the court must
independently determine whether an emergency actually exists and whether the challenged statute
actually addresses it.”); id. at 837, 928 P.2d at 1081 (“[T]he Legislature’s declaration of emergency
goes not to legislative discretion, but to its constitutional power—the Legislature may circumvent the
people’s right of referendum only if an emergency of a particular kind truly exists.”).
133. Oddly, Justice Sanders was unconvinced that the Stadium Act was immediately necessary to
keep the Mariners in Seattle. He appeared to miss the point that the promise to fund a stadium (not
the actual construction) was the incentive necessary to persuade the team to stay. Rather, he argued
that although the act-imposed taxes for the purpose of funding a stadium, it did “nothing to mandate
construction of a stadium or keep a baseball team.” Id. at 823, 928 P.2d at 1074.
134. See,
e.g.,
S.J.
Res.
8206,
63rd
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Wash.
2013),
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argue that any attempt to weaken the right to referendum should be
thwarted.135 These advocates have pushed for procedural changes
(requiring a supermajority to approve emergency legislation, for example)
to strengthen the right to referendum and to weaken the Legislature’s
ability to attach emergency clauses to bills.136 Before discussing these
suggested procedural changes, however, it is vital to reiterate the purpose
of the referendum itself.
A.

The Purpose of the Referendum

The benefits of the referendum power typically fall into three
categories. First, the referendum functions as a check on government by
enabling the people to overturn legislative acts that they do not support.137
In this way, the people are viewed as a “fourth branch” of government,
offering a “valuable safety valve” to regulate the political system.138
Moreover, the threat of referendum puts pressure on the Legislature to
consider how the people will react to its actions.139 Second, the
referendum diminishes the influence of political parties over
government.140 Third, direct democracy—including referendum power—
encourages public involvement in government.141 The opportunity for
involvement in the political process increases political awareness and
public participation.142 The increase in awareness and participation is
achieved by public discussion and debate over referendum measures and
may result in a more politically informed, and less apathetic, electorate.143

http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP]; Page, supra note 20, at 223; Sharkansky, supra note 3.
135. Page, supra note 20, at 223.
136. Id. (“[A]ny attempts to weaken the referendum process should be rejected, and steps should
be taken to prevent the unwarranted intrusion upon the people’s right to referendum.”).
137. Id. at 234.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 235.
141. Id. at 237.
142. Id. at 234.
143. Id. at 237.
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Attempts at Regulating the Washington Legislature’s Use of
Emergency Clauses

Relying on these benefits, proponents of the right to referendum argue
that the Legislature’s power to exempt bills should be checked.144 Many
argue this check could be achieved by adding procedural hurdles to
dissuade the Legislature from attaching an emergency clause to a bill.145
Recommended procedural hurdles include adding a supermajority voting
requirement to bills with emergency clauses, implementing more stringent
judicial review, and requiring the Legislature to articulate facts supporting
its finding of emergency.146
Attempts to reform the Washington Legislature’s use of emergency
clauses have come in the same form. For example, an unsuccessful Senate
bill in 2013 proposed amending the Constitution to allow emergency
clauses only as amendments to a bill and to require that such clauses be
approved by 60% of each house of the Legislature.147 This bill died in the
Senate Rules Committee and never made it to a vote on the senate floor.148
V.

A WORKABLE STANDARD TO EVALUATE EMERGENCY
CLAUSES

Aside from required procedural hurdles (gathering signatures, for
example), the emergency exception is the sole limit on the people’s right
to referendum. Yet, the Washington Constitution does not explain when
an act is “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety.”149 Moreover, despite allowing for judicial review of the
Legislature’s use of an emergency clause, the definition of emergency has
not been coherently resolved by the courts. The deferential standard of
review in such cases contributes to a lack of clarity regarding when an
emergency clause validly exempts a bill from referendum. This Comment

144. Id. at 271–79.
145. Id.; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201314/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP].
146. Page, supra note 20, at 271–79; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP].
147. S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201314/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP].
148. The bill was moved to the “X” file on March 3rd during the 2014 regular session. SJR 8206 2013-14, Bill History: 2013 Regular Session, WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE,
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=8206&Year=2013 [https://perma.cc/7SJ7-B7G2].
149. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
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proposes a definition for the public safety exception to referendum in
Washington.
An appropriate definition of emergency legislation should be consistent
with the policy reasoning behind the emergency exception. As discussed
in Clausen, the drafters of Washington’s initiative and referendum
provision intended to strike a balance between supporting direct
democracy and allowing the Legislature to act quickly where swift action
is warranted.150 On the one hand, the referendum process allows a small
percentage of citizens who sign a petition to “circumvent the judgement
of the elected body charged with representing all of the public.”151 On the
other hand, the emergency exception prevents that small minority (now
4% of voters)152 from undermining the ability of a majority of elected
representatives to fulfill their legislative duty.153 This balance is
intentional: as the Clausen Court explained, the emergency exception was
designed to avoid circumstances where a small minority entirely nullifies
the purpose of an act even before it is pushed to a popular vote.154 The
Court applied this reasoning to the support-of-the-state-government
exception,155 but the policy reasoning applies to the public safety
exception as well.156
Washington’s current case law examining the scope of the public safety
exception also defines emergencies in relation to a bill’s purpose. In other
words, the Court has recognized that an emergency may exist if enacting
a bill immediately is necessary to achieve the purpose behind the piece of
legislation. Indeed, this understanding of emergency is, in essence, where
the Court was heading in CLEAN.157 Although he failed to clearly
articulate this standard, Justice Alexander saw that a real emergency was
present, even in the absence of a traditional crisis, because allowing a
referendum would completely and permanently destroy the purpose of the
bill. As he stated in CLEAN, the Stadium Act responded to a “real
emergency in the sense that the public purpose [that the Legislature]
sought to achieve by passing the Stadium Act would be unattainable” if a
150. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915).
151. Lowe, supra note 14, at 631.
152. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b).
153. Id.
154. Clausen, 85 Wash. at 267, 148 P. at 30.
155. Id.
156. Lowe, supra note 14, at 595 (“In those jurisdictions where deferred laws are suspended until
approved by the voters, the permissive referendum can nullify vital measures whose importance to
society depends upon the certainty of timely enforcement.”).
157. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).
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referendum was allowed.158 According to the Court, “the emergency that
faced the Legislature was that the Seattle Mariners would be put up for
sale on October 30 unless, prior to that date, the Legislature enacted [a bill
assuring] the development of a new . . . baseball stadium in King
County.”159 The Legislature reasonably believed that losing the Mariners
would result in lost jobs, tax revenue, and recreational opportunities.160
Therefore, the Court was persuaded that the threat of the Mariners leaving
Seattle required immediate action. Because it faced a deadline, the
Legislature’s ability to address the issue would have been entirely
destroyed had the Legislature been unable to act immediately. Thus, for
reasons consistent with the legislative intent behind the emergency
exception, Justice Alexander found that a referendum would have
inappropriately encroached on the Legislature’s ability to do its job.161
Unfortunately, Justice Alexander’s opaque and hesitant reasoning left
the majority’s opinion vulnerable to criticism.162 Despite departing from
Brislawn’s narrow construction of the public safety exception, the
majority did not acknowledge that it intended to craft a new standard. Nor
did the opinion clearly outline the policy reasons supporting a broader
standard. Given these omissions, it is unsurprising that critics found
Justice Sanders’ dissent compelling—the majority failed to persuasively
explain that the public safety exception should not be confined to the
traditional emergencies relied upon in earlier cases such as Brislawn.163
This Comment makes that argument clear.
A.

A Viable Standard for the Public Safety Exception

This Comment suggests that the public safety exception should exempt
a bill from a referendum if the bill accomplishes a public purpose that
would be substantially thwarted if the Legislature was unable to act
immediately. This definition covers a narrow set of circumstances where
the Legislature’s objective would be irretrievably destroyed if a bill were
referred to a public vote. It specifically encompasses two scenarios
requiring prompt action: (1) cases where the harm is so severe that an

158. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067.
159. Id. at 812, 928 P.2d at 1068.
160. Id. at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067.
161. See id.
162. See Page, supra note 20, at 248 (criticizing Justice Alexander’s opinion in CLEAN and arguing
that “[n]o effort was made to explain how a publicly funded stadium preserves the ‘public peace,
health or safety’ . . . or how it fits into traditional police powers”).
163. See id.
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immediate response is necessary to mitigate ongoing damage, and
(2) instances where the law’s purpose would be irreparably undermined if
the effective date was delayed pending referral.164 The first scenario
covers traditional emergencies (an ongoing public health crisis, for
example),165 whereas the second scenario is about immediacy rather than
severity. The second scenario would cover the situation in CLEAN v. State
where immediate action was necessary to accomplish the act’s intended
purpose—to persuade the Mariners to stay in Seattle.166
B.

Procedural Reforms to the Right to Referendum Are Inconsistent
with the Emergency Exception’s Policy Objectives

This Comment’s proposed standard aligns with the policy reasoning
behind the emergency exception and is, therefore, a more appropriate
solution than proposed procedural reforms. Advocates of such reforms
argue that the Legislature’s power to exempt bills should be checked.167
Some argue this check could be achieved by adding procedures to
dissuade the Legislature from using emergency clauses (for example, a
supermajority voting requirement), by implementing more stringent
judicial review, or by requiring the Legislature to articulate facts
supporting its finding of emergency.168 This section will address each of
these suggestions.
Procedural reforms aimed at dissuading the Legislature from using an
emergency clause do not get to the heart of the matter: that the Legislature
lacks direction about when the public safety exception should apply.
Instead of giving direction to the Legislature, procedural solutions
arbitrarily alter the referendum process in an attempt to prevent the
Legislature from “misusing” the emergency exception. However, the
Legislature cannot avoid misusing the exception without understanding
its intended purpose. For example, rather than clarifying what an
emergency should entail, a supermajority voting requirement would
simply deter the Legislature from including an emergency clause in a bill
164. These scenarios are derived partially by the balancing test recommended by Lowe. Lowe,
supra note 14, at 633.
165. Id. at 595 n.21 (“[A] legislative act creating a remedy for victims of toxic chemicals or
establishing a task force to develop a cure for AIDS will be of little value to the public if it is
suspended pending the next general election.”).
166. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054.
167. See supra section IV.B.
168. Page, supra note 20, at 271–79; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP].
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regardless of the circumstances.169 While this requirement—which the
Legislature has already rejected170—may “guard against the possibility
that the legislature may attach an emergency clause to a bill solely to
exempt it from referendum,”171 it does not solve the issue in a meaningful
way. Essentially, this solution suggests that an emergency is what more
legislators believe it is.172 But because the supermajority requirement does
not provide an intelligible definition of emergency, there is no guarantee
that this solution is consistent with the emergency exception’s policy
objectives.
By the same token, implementing strict judicial review or requiring the
Legislature to articulate facts supporting a declaration of emergency are
unconstructive solutions absent a workable definition of emergency. For
example, even with stricter review, the courts cannot determine whether
an emergency exists without understanding what should constitute an
emergency. Unless, and until, the Court adopts a viable definition of
emergency, these reforms will lead to arbitrary results.
This Comment’s proposed standard provides the definition of
emergency that procedural reforms lack. Instead of arbitrarily deterring
the Legislature from using an emergency clause, the proposed standard
would ensure that the Legislature exempts only bills that should take
immediate effect. In this way, the proposed standard would better ensure
that the Legislature’s use of an emergency clause is consistent with the
intent behind Washington’s emergency exception. This Comment’s
proposed standard also directly addresses the criticism that the Legislature
uses sham emergency clauses simply to avoid referendum. By providing
a clear definition of emergency, the proposed standard would (1) dissuade
the Legislature from using sham emergency clauses and (2) enable the
courts to identify when the Legislature has misused the public safety
exception.
This is not to say that procedural reforms have no place in improving
Washington’s referendum process. To further ensure transparency and
reviewability, the Legislature should include facts that support its
declaration of emergency in the act itself.173 As Justice Guy identified in
169. Page, supra note 20, at 279.
170. S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/201314/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP].
171. Page, supra note 20, at 280; S.J. Res. 8206, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Joint%20Resolutions/8206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZC5-RVGP].
172. Page, supra note 20, at 279.
173. Id.
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his dissent in CLEAN, unless the emergency is apparent from the nature
of the act itself, judicial review will be ineffective if the Legislature does
not explain the emergency situation in the act.174 Requiring such an
explanation will help ensure that the Legislature is held accountable and
that courts can coherently evaluate whether the standard is met.
CONCLUSION
To strike the right balance between the people’s right to referendum
and the Legislature’s need to effectuate certain laws immediately, the
Court should reexamine the purpose of the emergency exception to the
right to referendum in Washington. Without added transparency, the
perception of improper legislative use of emergency clauses will continue.
For this perception to change, the Legislature needs clear guidance to
determine when a bill addressing a non-traditional emergency is properly
exempt from a referendum. A viable standard must also prevent the
Legislature from abusing the emergency clause to circumvent the people
when immediate action is not actually necessary. This Comment argues
that the public safety exception should exempt a bill from a referendum
when the bill accomplishes a public purpose, where the purpose is
explicitly stated in the legislation, and where that purpose would be
substantially thwarted if the Legislature was unable to act immediately. In
addition to traditional public health and disaster situations, this proposed
standard covers a narrow set of circumstances where the Legislature’s
ability to act on an issue would be destroyed if a bill were referred to a
public vote. The recommended exception encompasses two scenarios
requiring immediate action: (1) cases where the harm is so severe that
immediate action is necessary to mitigate ongoing damage, and (2) cases
where the law’s purpose would be irreparably undermined if the effective
date were delayed pending referral. This understanding of emergency is
consistent with Washington’s current case law examining the scope of the
public safety exception and with the policy reasoning behind the Court’s
interpretation of the support-of-the-state-government exception.
Ultimately, this standard would provide a less unwieldy and more
transparent method for courts to achieve the right result.

174. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 821, 928 P.2d 1054, 1073 (1996).

